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bstract
lural governance structures arise when a firm conduct the same transaction simultaneously under more than one governance structure. The article
resents a classification of cases of plural governance structures, based on the rationale behind the choice of a combination of simple governance
tructures. The method was the comparison of cases reported in the literature. Four main sets of cases occurring plural forms were found, in which
he governance structures are complementary; determined by resources available to firms; explained the diversity of contract makers; and related
o the history of the firm. Various theoretical lenses are useful to analyze the phenomenon of plural, particularly Transaction Costs Economics,
esource Based View, and Industrial Organization, setting then the issue of the adequacy of theories to the concrete cases.
 2017 Departamento de Administrac¸a˜o, Faculdade de Economia, Administrac¸a˜o e Contabilidade da Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo – FEA/USP.
ublished by Elsevier Editora Ltda. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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esumo
struturas de governanc¸a plurais surgem quando uma mesma transac¸ão é conduzida por uma firma simultaneamente sob mais de uma estrutura
e governanc¸a simples. O artigo apresenta uma classificac¸ão de casos de estruturas de governanc¸a plurais, baseada na racionalidade subjacente à
scolha da combinac¸ão de estruturas de governanc¸a. O método foi a revisão e comparac¸ão de casos relatados na literatura. Foram identificados
uatro grandes conjuntos de casos em que ocorrem formas plurais: em que as estruturas de governanc¸a são complementares; as determinadas
ela disponibilidade de recursos para a firma; as explicadas pela diversidade dos tomadores de contrato; e as relacionadas à história da firma. O
enômeno das formas plurais pode ser analisado sob diversas lentes teóricas, especialmente a Economia dos Custos de transac¸ão, a Visão Baseada
m Recursos, e a Organizac¸ão Industrial, colocando-se então o problema da adequac¸ão das teorias aos casos concretos.
 2017 Departamento de Administrac¸a˜o, Faculdade de Economia, Administrac¸a˜o e Contabilidade da Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo – FEA/USP.
ublicado por Elsevier Editora Ltda. Este e´ um artigo Open Access sob uma licenc¸a CC BY (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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In a well known work on philosophy of science, Adam
mith depicted theories as “imaginary machines” that link in
uman mind several phenomena whose connections are not
irectly observable. In many aspects, intellectual systems look
ike devices composed by connected parts. Even without seeing
t, the opera spectator knows that there is a hidden mechanism
hat moves the sceneries and the curtains (Smith, 1986). The
ands of an analog clock can be moved either by mechan-
cal energy accumulated in a spring, or by electromagnetic
nergy accumulated in a battery. What one see on the display,
owever, is always the same dance of the hours. This article
rgues that in the case of plural governance structures, differ-
nt mechanisms can produce the same apparent effect. As a
onsequence, there would not be a general theory capable of
ccounting for all reported cases of plural forms. In such cir-
umstances, a classification of plural forms would be a useful
ool for identifying the theories most suited to each class of plural
rrangements.
According to Bradach and Eccles (1989), a plural form
merges when the same firm adopts different governance struc-
ures to conduct identical or very similar transactions. This type
f arrangement can occur either in obtaining inputs, when a firm
imultaneously produces part of the intermediate input that con-
umes and acquires from third parties the remaining quantity,
r in the distribution of products, when a firm sells its products
hrough wholesalers while retaining their own stores.
The phenomenon of plural forms is relevant to the Transac-
ion Cost Economics because, together with the phenomena of
ultiple governance structures in the same industry, and organi-
ational arrangements among firms that allocate property rights
n a way that the units act coordinately without an unified hier-
rchy (hybrid governance), requires that the famous dilemma
etween making or buying, between markets and hierarchies, to
e complemented and extended (Ménard, 2013). Sauvée (2013)
efined hybrid governance as an institutional arrangement that
ombines a structure of authority and a coordination architec-
ure, in the presence of assets explored jointly by different firms.
lural forms consist of adopting different authority structures
nd coordination architectures to conduct identical or very sim-
lar transactions within a single firm.
The contribution of the Transaction Cost Economics to the
heory of Organizations lies in the possibility of explaining the
aison d’être  of organizations based on the attributes of the trans-
ctions they carry out. The inaugural landmark of this research
rogram was Coase’s (1937) essay on the nature of the firm.
he distinctive feature of firms in opposition to markets is the
eplacement of price mechanism by hierarchy to coordinate pro-
uction. Transaction costs include, among others, pecuniary and
on-pecuniary costs incurred in obtaining information relevant
o decision-making, communicating with the agents involved in
he transaction, monitoring the behavior of those agents, mea-
uring the relevant attributes of the goods and services. They
lso encompass the costs of negotiating, processing, monitor-
ng, and enforcing contracts. Everything else constant, the firm
ould choose the least costly means of conducting transactions.
o
t
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However, transaction costs are not fully measurable and
ometimes even observable. This fact would preclude the test
f theory, if it were not possible to establish a predictable
nd theoretically determinable relationship between observable
ttributes of transactions and their hidden costs. An important
tep in overcoming this limitation was made by Williamson
1975), assuming that transaction costs vary with certain charac-
eristics of the agents involved (notably opportunism combined
ith limited rationality), with attributes of transacted goods, as
ell as with the institutional environment that supports transac-
ions. The choice between making and buying would be based
n the comparative efficiency of the market and the hierarchy to
erform the same operations.
Williamson established relationships among the performance
f the organization, the governance structures mobilized to
rive transactions, the costs, and the attributes of the transac-
ions. Three attributes of the transactions deserved attention:
ncertainty, the frequency with which a particular transaction
s repeated, and the “degree to which investments are idiosyn-
ratic”, that is, the degree to which the investments required for
 given transaction cannot be fully recovered, if resources were
ssigned to the second best alternative (Williamson, 1979).
Asset specificity can have several origins: location, perisha-
ility, technical and/or quality standards, dedicated assets, brand,
nd, among other possible sources, human capital. An increase in
ncertainty, frequency, or degree of idiosyncrasy of investment
roduces, ceteris paribus, an increase in transaction costs.
With these three elements, the relevant observable attributes
f the transactions, the transaction costs (not directly observ-
ble) and the choice of the instrument to conduct the transactions
observable), it is possible to make predictions that, at least in
rinciple, can be tested. The higher the transaction costs in the
arket, the greater the difficulty in using the pricing system to
ombine productive resources. Thus, such transactions would
e most likely conducted within organizations, governed by
ierarchical command.
Hybrid forms, including contracts, combine, in different
roportions, incentives and controls (Williamson, 1996). The
ctivities needed to provide incentives and exercise control are
ostly. Since the required proportions of these two coordination
nstruments vary between governance structures, transaction
osts can be expected to vary when the structure of governance
mployed to conduct the same transaction changes.
Studies such as that of Saes and Silveira (2014) deepen the
nderstanding of the alignment of governance structures with
he characteristics of transactions. The type of interdependence
etween agents (which may be joint/simultaneous, sequential,
r reciprocal) explains which governance structure will be most
requent. When the gains from cooperation are limited to one
tage of the production process and the contribution of each
gent is well defined (as in the joint acquisition of inputs by a
ool of independent producers), short-term contracts would pre-
ail. When the gains of cooperation are long lasting and agents
enefit from common resources (such as in the designation of
rigin or products of specific quality), formal long-term rela-
ional contracts, complemented by reputation and trust, would
e the most appropriate and frequent arrangements.
1 ment 
o
b
c
W
n
c
a
u
t
o
c
t
f
t
t
f
t
a
t
M
d
a
t
o
i
p
r
O
t
t
a
p
p
–
t
r
p
d
a
t
e
t
i
i
T
o
(
M
I
o
c
p
m
t
s
m
t
n
i
t
n
e
e
d
m
w
i
a
t
p
a
c
n
t
u
t
e
o
c
e
j
e
g
i
i
e
l
t
fi
I
c
a
e
c
I00 R. Nunes / RAUSP Manage
Innumerable cases in which plural governance structures are
bserved challenge the proposition that in each case there would
e a single structure of governance able to minimize transaction
osts (as seems to follow from the choice model presented by
illiamson). According to Bradach and Eccles (1989), gover-
ance mechanisms (which they call price, authority, and trust)
ould be combined in different ways to conduct the same trans-
ctions. The authors have called plural forms the simultaneous
se of more than one governance structure to conduct equivalent
ransactions.
Ménard (2013) argued that the explanation of the existence
f plural forms has its roots in governance problems. Based on
ases in Brazilian and European agribusiness chains, he iden-
ified three important determinants for the adoption of plural
orms: ambiguity regarding the best way to organize transac-
ions, the complexity of the transaction or interrelated sets of
ransactions, and strategic behavior of agents. The motivation
or a theory of plural forms came from the realization of the exis-
ence of an intriguing diversity of hybrid arrangements. Without
 theory, the accumulated mass of empirical evidence threatens
o make the field of study disorganized and confusing.
In line with Puranam, Gulaty, and Bhattacharya (2013) and
adhok (1996), for whom the theories about the “make or buy”
ilemma do not explain all cases of plural forms, this article
rgues that the explanatory elements of the plural forms iden-
ified by Ménard (2013) are relevant and cover a wide range
f cases, but there are other cases where ambiguity, complex-
ty and strategic behavior are not the main determinants. The
henomenon of plural forms can be analyzed under various theo-
etical lenses, among them Resource-Based View and Industrial
rganization. Some of these lenses do not emphasize transac-
ion costs. As a consequence of the plurality of explanations,
he problem of the appropriateness of theories to concrete cases
rises.
The purpose of this paper is to propose an attempt to classify
lural forms, based on the rationality underlying the choice of a
ortfolio of governance structures. Although the result is similar
 the use of different structures to govern the same transaction –
he motives that lead to the choice may be diverse, and they are
elevant to the understanding of the phenomenon. The present
aper intends to contribute to the understanding of plural forms
rawing attention to the diversity of phenomena that, taken in
bstract, look the same: using more than one governance struc-
ure to conduct the same transactions. Without pretending to
xhaust all possibilities, the article suggests a classification of
he plural forms, hoping that it will be improved and used as an
nstrument to organize the empirical evidence, which is rapidly
ncreasing.
ypes  of  plural  forms
The mapping of plural structures of governance was based
n the literature reviews undertaken by Tadelis and Williamson
2013), and Cano (2016), and in the case studies reported in
énard (2013) and Ménard, Saes, Silva, and Raynauld (2014).
n general, case studies describe the reasons, benefits, and costs
f adopting or maintaining plural forms. Thus, the criterion for
r
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lassifying cases was the rationality underlying the choice of
lural forms of governance. The most appropriate theoretical
atrix for reading each case would be the one that accounts for
he variables that in fact influenced the choice of the governance
tructure.
The first watershed consists in the fact that the presence of
ore than one governance structure affects or does not affect
he net value of transactions conducted through other gover-
ance structures. In other words, it is about whether or not there
s transactions cost subadditivity. Is the expected net value of
ransactions governed by means of plural forms less than the
et value of the same transactions conducted under the most
fficient singular form?
We found four distinct classes of plural forms. The first group
ncompasses cases where governance structures are interdepen-
ent, and more specifically, complementary. Complementarities
ay refer to (i) reduction of information asymmetry in cases
here vertical integration provides useful information for mon-
toring contracts, (ii) bargaining power and the solution of
gency problems, when the possibility of one part refusing the
ransaction disciplines the other parties, and finally (iii) com-
lementarities may be related to difficulties in measuring the
ttributes and/or transaction costs. In these cases, the agent who
hooses the governance structure cannot identify the best alter-
ative under any condition, and may opt for a combination of
hem.
The nature of the plural forms of the second group touches
pon the resources of the firms, including, but not limited to, the
echnological resources and the optimal scale of the plants. How-
ver, technological restraint is not sufficient for the emergence
f plural forms. It would also require a combination of funding
onstraints (e.g. to prevent the construction of new plants on the
fficient scale) and/or market size (sales opportunities would not
ustify increasing installed capacity).
The third class includes cases in which the diversity of gov-
rnance structures is explained by the diversity of preferences of
overnance-takers, which differ in relation to risk aversion and
ntertemporal preferences.
There is finally a class where the adoption of plural forms
s not supported by a strong economic rationality, but is rather
xplained by the history of the firm. These structures are no
onger optimal, after organizational innovations or changes in
he environment, but they continue in use.
In some cases, maintaining plural forms inherited from the
rm’s past do not raise business costs (weak path dependence).
n other cases, a single governance structure would be more effi-
ient (strong path dependence), but the costs of reorganization
re high, making persist a suboptimal governance structure.
The classification presented here does not pretend to be
xhaustive, admitting the possibility of new studies revealing
ategories not yet identified in the literature.
nterdependence  between  different  governance  structures
educes transaction  costs
In this class of cases, the predominant theoretical matrix is
ransaction Cost Economics, since the rationality underlying the
R. Nunes / RAUSP Management Journal 53 (2018) 98–108 101
Table 1
Examples of studies in plural forms with interdependent governance structures.
Year Author Country Industry Main findings
1992 Gallini and
Lutz
Theoretical model Franchises The plural form allows the capture and signaling of private information
regarding the demand for new products. The share of own stores decline as
the private information became common.
1995 Dutta, Bergen,
Heide, & John
United States Electric and
mechanic
Risk of dependence and difficulty of assessing the performance of sales
representatives induce industries to vertically integrate part of the sales
force.
1996 Wolak United States Thermoelectric
power
Transactions in the spot coal market mitigate the risks of opportunistic
behavior for both parties involved in the supply of coal to the
thermoelectric plants.
1997 Azevedo Brazil Frozen and
concentrated
orange juice
The vertical integration of part of the orange demanded by the processing
industry reduces the bargaining power of citrus growers. The locational
and temporal specificity of orchards influences the distribution of the
quasi-rent.
1997 Bradach United States Fast-food
(franchises)
Plural forms provide a benchmark between proprietary and franchised
stores, and facilitate the adaptation of the entire system – mutual learning
improves the innovation process.
1999 Lewin-
Solomons
United States Fast-food
(franchises)
The adoption of plural forms facilitates the acceptance of innovations
proposed by the franchisor and avoids the imposition of inefficient
innovations. Own stores reduce the information asymmetry between
franchisor and franchisee.
2011 Meiseberg Germany Retail and
services
(franchises)
Synergies provided by franchised stores are important determinants in the
choice of governance mix, facilitating the uniformity of products and
services, and the adaptability of the franchise system.
2013 Puranam,
Gulaty, and
Bhattacharya
Theoretical model The supply through plural forms is optimal when the complementarity
effects and/or firm constraints are strong face the risks involved in the
transactions.
2013 Feltre and
Paulillo
State of São Paulo, Brazil Sugarcane Different compositions of governance structures have been found in the
same industry and region. Benefits of plural forms: reduction of the
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ilural form is the reduction of transaction costs obtained through
he simultaneous use of two (or more) governance structures. A
aradigmatic example is the franchise network’s own stores,
hich provide the franchisor with information on franchised
tores’ operating costs, providing parameters for negotiating the
istribution of the quasi-rent generated by the business (Silva
 Azevedo, 2011). Table 1 summarizes some examples drawn
rom the literature.
The interdependence of governance structures may also be
elated to the solution of agency problems, insofar as the exis-
ence of an alternative to the transaction with a given agent
isciplines the behavior of the parties, inhibiting manifestations
f opportunism.
In an analysis of relationships between citrus growers and
range processors, Azevedo (1997) argued that vertical inte-
ration of orchards by industry increases bargaining power in
he purchase of fruit. Oranges in the orchard are highly specific
ssets, since there is an optimal period for harvesting and, con-
equently, for the sale of the fruit. Once harvested, the orange
oes not mature anymore. If, on the other hand, the harvest is
ostponed, the fruit dehydrates and begins to rot. The own sup-
ly of fruit allows the processor to wait, whereas at the time of
arvest the producer would be pressed to sell.
Measuring uncertainty, the degree of asset specificity and
ven the moral hazard involved in a transaction may be impos-
ible, difficult, or very costly. The firm may choose to use two
r more governance structures because it is unable to assess
t
m
culnerability of the plant and opening of information channel.
he consequences of choice and does not fully accept the risk
f a choice that in the future proves to be inadequate. In this
ase, the interdependence between distinct governance struc-
ures is related to its ability to mitigate the risk of failures when
ntegrated into a portfolio of governance structures.
To determine the value of a transaction, it would be necessary
o measure the relevant attributes of the goods or services, as well
s evaluate ex-ante the transaction costs in each alternative orga-
izational form. The problem is that, with agents characterized
y limited rationality and opportunism, only exceptionally this
nformation would be available by the time of decision-making.
) Ambiguity in the measurement of relevant attributes of the
transactions
Ménard (2013) named “ambiguity” one of the difficulties
f comparing alternative governance structures, associated with
he measurement of the relevant attributes of the transactions.
f the value of the transactions depends on their attributes, and
he attributes are evaluated very imprecisely, then the value of
he transactions conducted under different governance structures
ecomes vague, which gives rise to the difficulty, or even the
mpossibility, of choosing the less costly option to governing
ransactions.
Relevant attributes of transactions, such as asset specificity,
ay vary unpredictably over time. For example, a food processor
an vertically integrate part of the production of raw materials,
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ecause eventually adverse shocks impact production. During
he shortages, the specificity of the asset rises, making vertical
ntegration the most efficient governance structure. In normal
eriods, the asset (industrial facilities to process the agricul-
ural product) becomes less specific, in which case the market
r contracts would minimize the transaction costs.
This possibility suggests that asset specificity, understood as
n opportunity cost, varies with the market environment (e.g.
alance of supply and demand) and may not be symmetric, that
s, it may not be the same for the two poles of the transaction.
onsider an orchard next to a fruit processing industry. There
s spatial specificity of the asset (orchard), since, if the fruit
s diverted to another processor, the higher freight will reduce
he net value received by the fruit grower. However, in times
f fruit scarcity, more distant processors can make offers that
ompensate for the spatial disadvantage.
The example of fruit processing presents a relevant peculiar-
ty, which is the fact that the two poles of the transaction, fruit
rowers and processors, control specific assets. The orchards
ave spatial and temporal specificity. Industrial plants and
ogistics equipment are dedicated assets and also have spatial
pecificity. The specificities of grower’s and processor’s assets
ary over time and this variation is negatively correlated. The
carcity of the fruit reduces the specificity of the orchard, and
ncreases that of the industrial plant; abundance produces the
nverse effect. In this context, the question of the optimal gov-
rnance structure may not have a single answer: in the harvest,
he industries would prefer the spot market while the producers
ould prefer the contracts. In the off season, preferences would
e reversed.
) Complexity of transactions and difficulty in evaluating their
costs
The difficulty of determining the transaction costs associated
ith each governance structure and hence of establishing a pref-
rence order between them increases as transactions become
ore and more complex. Complexity refers to the degree to
hich the outcome of a transaction depends on many variables,
s well as on different states of nature, which are related in a
ay that is not fully understood by the decision maker. As a
onsequence, the agent has little confidence in his own judg-
ents about the value of the many alternatives to governing
uch transactions.
It is worth to note that the problem of making or buying can
e replaced as the choice of two alternative sets of transactions,
he purchase of the intermediate input, or the purchase of more
lementary raw materials, capital goods, and labor power. In
omplex economies, either option inserts the firm into a spe-
ific link of production chain. Firms do not exist outside the
roduction networks. Put in this way, the problem of making
r buying translates into the choice of how the firm will fit into
he producer/consumer network, that is, of defining the firm’s
oundaries.
The result of transactions that depend on the decisions of
any agents inserted in complex networks can be evaluated
nly in an imprecise way, since the monitoring of all the agents
g
m
b
arnance structure.
ource: Adapted from Williamson (1996).
nvolved is difficult or even impossible. The game becomes very
omplicated. Assuming only two states of the agent output –
onform and not conform to a given standard, for example – a
inear chain with n  agents would have n2 states, which makes
t difficult to evaluate as n  grows. Asymmetries in the network,
s in the poultry and pig industry, where an agent controls suf-
cient resources to exercise the coordination of the production
rocess, can reduce the degree of complexity.
The network topology can also be more or less complex,
ffecting the evaluation of the transactions. However, there is no
irect relationship between the complexity of network design
nd the complexity of calculating transaction value. A linear,
imple-structure network can make computation complex if the
eight of the action of each agent on the final result is very high,
hereas in a more complex network, the failures of one agent
ould be compensated by others. In complex networks some
gents could become superfluous because it would be possible
o complete the transaction in different alternative circuits.
In Williamson’s model of governance choice (1996), asset
pecificity varies continuously. The costs of transactions con-
ucted in the market, through contracts, and within the firm are
ontinuously growing with the level of specificity of the assets,
ut at different rates. Governance structures also have differ-
nt fixed costs. As a result, the structure of governance that
conomizes transaction costs is conditioned to the level of asset
pecificity.
In Fig. 1, k  represents the specificity level of the assets
nvolved in the transaction. C  is the transaction cost. The func-
ions m(k), x(k), and h(k) provide the transaction cost associated
ith each level of asset specificity for transactions conducted
espectively in the market (m), by hybrid forms (contracts) (x),
nd under hierarchical control (vertical integration) (h).
The greater the intensity of the controls required to conduct
he transaction, the higher the fixed cost associated with the
overnance structure. However, variable transaction costs grow
ore rapidly in less-fit governance structures to monitor the
ehavior of the agent placed at the opposite pole of the trans-
ction. There are, among different governance structures, the
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artial substitutability of fixed costs by variable costs, reflecting
he different compositions of incentives and controls.
In general, a single governance structure minimizes transac-
ion costs, given the level of specificity of the assets involved in
he transaction. Thus, with the specificity of asset k0, the mar-
et is the mode that saves transaction costs. This is the logic of
illiamson’s choice model.
At level k1 the specificity of the asset is well determined,
ut the transaction costs associated with the use of contracts are
ssessed in an imprecise manner. The decision-maker believes
hat the transaction cost falls in the range between the dashed
ines parallel to x(k), but in this range it is not possible to
nambiguously determine the structure of governance that min-
mizes transaction costs, whether hierarchy or hybrid form. The
ecision-maker conjectures that costs of contracting are in the
ange of C(k′1) to C(k′′1 ), but she cannot decide whether they
re higher, lower or equivalent to the costs incurred in vertical
ntegration.
If the specificity of the assets were unambiguously assessed,
he firm would choose vertical integration if the degree of speci-
city of the assets were k3, or choose to contract with third
arties, if the level of specificity were k2. However, in prac-
ice, it is not possible to know ex-ante the “true” level of
sset specificity, nor, consequently, to determine the transac-
ion costs associated with each governance structure. The firm
ould not be able, under such conditions, to sort out its prefer-
nces regarding feasible governance structures. If the difference
etween transactions costs associated with alternative gover-
ance structures is sufficiently large, the firm could choose to
aintain at the same time two structures, vertical integration
nd contract, as a mechanism to protect against the risk of a
oor choice.
In cases where plural forms derive from interdependent
overnance structures, empirical research could be guided by
estable hypotheses such as:
 The relevant information (costs, profitability) is not shared
spontaneously between the parties; asymmetry of informa-
tion is present. In such cases, one party vertically integrates a
given activity to obtain strategic information about the other
contracting party.
 Negotiation is conflictive and, at least temporarily and in cer-
tain circumstances, each of the parties involved is able to
impose losses on others. Vertical integration would strengthen
the bargaining power of one party, increasing the value cap-
tured in transactions governed by contracts.
 A governance structure (usually vertical integration) pro-
vides information used to monitor other structures. When
the transaction involves highly specific assets, the markets
do not provide relevant information about the parties’ costs
and margins. Vertical integration has the function of generat-
ing information necessary to evaluate the performance of the
other party. The measurement of the relevant characteristics of the goods
or services (quality) is impossible, difficult or very costly.
Uncertainty about the quality of transacted goods or ser-
vices may induce the adoption of more than one governanceJournal 53 (2018) 98–108 103
structure. This arrangement may be transient (if an efficient
structure is discovered) or permanent (if there is no clearly a
more advantageous structure).
 The determination of transaction costs (uncertainty about the
parties’ behavior and/or the success of the transaction) is
impossible, difficult, or very costly. In such cases, the value
of the transaction, as well as the ex-post costs of monitoring
and enforcing property rights, is high and uncertain.
lural  forms  rooted  in  ﬁrm’s  resources
In this class the raison  d’être  of plural forms is related to lim-
ted availability of firm’s resources. By employing plural forms,
rganizations can mobilize third-party resources and grow faster
han if they mobilize only their own or indebted resources. Con-
traints on installed capacity at some stage of the production
rocess can also give rise to plural forms. In other situations, the
rm seeks in clients and suppliers useful knowledge to improve
he performance of its own operations. This class of cases is
ainly explained by financial, technological or knowledge man-
gement aspects, leaving transaction costs in a second plan.
he main paradigm that supports the analysis of these cases,
f which some examples are given in Table 2, is the Resource
ased View.
The choice of vertically integrating part of the production of
eeded inputs, while at the same time acquiring the rest of third
arties, either in the spot market or through contracts, can be effi-
ient in the presence of indivisible assets. Nunes and Makishi
2014) report the case of a company that produces beverages,
aving enough capacity to distill approximately 70% of the
ottled beverage. If investments were made to double installed
apacity, the two plants would have on average 30% idle capac-
ty. On the other hand, a distillation column with smaller capacity
ould not be as efficient as the equipment on the optimal scale.
he solution was to buy in bulk from third parties the amount
f distilled beverage corresponding to the difference between
he quantity demanded and the quantity distilled internally. In
his case, it is not about buying or making, but about making
nd buying – the two governance structures are used simultane-
usly to conduct the same transaction. This example suggests
hat because of economies of scale, it would not be feasible to
onstruct a “small” distillation column with approximately half
f the previously existing capacity, and that the idle capacity of
nother column of similar scale would be excessively onerous.
t is noteworthy that this arrangement has lasted for forty years
nd the firm considers it satisfactory. During this period, demand
rowth did not induce full vertical integration.
The following empirical hypotheses, among others, fit in
ases in which the plural forms are related to the endowment
f resources of the firm:
 One of the poles of the transaction presents strong economies
of scale and/or scope in a given segment of the production
chain. In the absence of high minimum efficient scales, there
would be no great difficulty in adjusting installed capacity to
demand without recourse to partners.
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Table 2
Examples of works in which plural forms are related to resources controlled by the firm.
Year Author Country Industry Main findings
1968 Oxenfeldt and Kelly Theoretical model Franchises Firms opt for the contractual modalities of franchising due to the
restriction of resources (including financial, human and physical)
experienced at the beginning of their activities.
1997 Bradach United States Franchises (fast-food) The franchise network can be expanded quickly without being
deeply affected by resource constraints.
2006 Rothaermel, Hitt, and Jobe World Microcomputers Plural forms enable the firm to have access to several sources of
knowledge, to integrate tacit knowledge and complementary assets
controlled by other firms.
2013 Feltre and Paulillo State of São Paulo – Brazil Sugarcane In a sugar mill, vertically integrated production of raw materials,
while able to reduce uncertainty in supply, was not adopted because
it would require the immobilization of substantial financial
resources.
2013 Puranam, Gulaty, and Bhattacharya Theoretical model Nonspecific Supply through plural forms is optimal when the complementarity
effects and/or effects of resources constraints are strong and offset
the risks involved in the transactions.
2014 Miranda and Chaddad Missouri – United States Wine The alignment between transaction characteristics and governance
structures is underpinned by appropriate sets of resources and
capabilities. Differences in skills help to explain organizational
diversity.
2014 Nunes and Makishi State of São Paulo – Brazil Cachac¸a The authors identified a case of a producer and bottler of cachac¸a
that acquires third-party raw beverages, since the demand exceeds
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( The firm faces difficulties in acquiring large amounts of raw
material in the market. There would be an incentive for full
vertical integration, but it would be advantageous to continue
acquiring from skilled suppliers, probably through formal or
relational contracts.
 Changes in demand do not affect the quantity transacted
through one of the governance structures (usually vertical
integration), being absorbed by the others (market and/or con-
tracts). Costs of vertically integrated supply will be probably
lower than costs of outsourcing. The most costly source of
supply will absorb variations in demand.
 The growth of vertically integrated production would be lim-
ited by the firm’s ability to raise funds in the financial market
and/or increase indebtedness. Although in this case vertical
integration is profitable, the firm fails to take this opportunity
due to lack of resources.
 The balance between incentives and controls in the arrange-
ments between firms varies according to the capabilities and
resources of the parties involved in the transaction. Firms
most gifted would require less strict controls, while less qual-
ified firms would need more resources for monitoring their
activities.
uppliers  or  customers  with  different  degrees  of  risk
version and  intertemporal  preferences
The mechanisms employed to govern similar transactions
same product, same position in the production chain) may vary
ue governance-taker’s preferences toward time and risk. Fre-
uently in these cases a governance-maker firm transacts with
everal clients and/or suppliers using different contracts, with
ifferent durations, risk allocations, and compensation schemes.
he governance-taker chooses the contract that best suits her
i
t
e
ithe capacity of its own distillation columns.
references. The theoretical basis of the analysis of these cases
s the microeconomic theory of choice, with emphasis on the
xpected utility. Table 3 gives examples of this class of plural
orms.
The differences in what we could generically denote as the
tility functions of transacting agents may give rise to the
mergence of plural forms. The choice model presented by
illiamson (1996) assumes that if the firm opts for contractual
orms, there will be someone willing to accept the contract in the
roposed form. But it is quite plausible that different suppliers
ave different preferences over the different feasible contracts.
irms that purchase fruits for processing use a broad portfolio of
ontracts in which suppliers have different levels of commitment
f quantities, responsibility for harvesting and transportation
ctivities, exposure to price risk, and participation in the results
f the business. As suppliers differ among themselves in terms
f farm size, crop specialization, non-farming income, among
ther factors, the same transaction may be conducted under dif-
erent governance structures according to the governance-taker
references. The industry is indifferent between the alternatives
ffered, and it is up to the supplier to choose the one that suits
er best.
Buyer risk aversion may encourage vertical integration, even
f the market offers low-cost options. The transaction is char-
cterized not only by the conditions in which the commodity
s offered, but also by characteristics of demanders and suppli-
rs. The choice of contract should be analyzed using both the
ifferences in transaction costs and in risk aversion. Cheung
1969) gives as an example a hospital that can obtain electric-
ty through a contract with the local supplier and at the same
ime have its own electric generators that are activated in the
vent of a supply interruption. Although it could be argued that
n this example there is no choice, given the very high costs of
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Table 3
Examples of papers in which plural forms are related to differences in preferences of governance takers.
Year Author Country Industry Main findings
1999 Marino State of São Paulo – Brazil Citrus growers The size of the citrus grower influences the duration of
orange supply contracts. Following the ban on the
standard contract, a wide range of contracts emerged.
2005 Menezes State of Minas Gerais – Brazil Coffee growers The attitude of the rural producer to risk is one of the
determinants of the choice between contracts and the
spot market.
2005 Souza Filho and Paulillo State of São Paulo – Brazil Citrus growers The size of the citrus grower influences the choice of
marketing channels and governance instruments in the
sale of the orange.
2014 Hansen, Owan, Pan, and Sugawara United States Experiment with students Student’s personal characteristics influence the choice
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anterrupting the supply of energy, for example, during a surgical
rocedure, it should be recognized that the hospital performs
wo distinct transactions for energy, one governed by vertical
ntegration and other by a standard contract. The hospital could
hoose even to fully integrate the power generation. A domestic
onsumer, who would have small losses from the power outage,
akes the risk and uses only the standard contract with the energy
istributor.
Characteristics of players, such as the propensity for oppor-
unism or commitment to the word engaged, influence the way
he game is played. According to Gulati and Nickerson (2008),
he choice of governance structure is affected by the prior exis-
ence of trust between organizations. High levels of trust would
e associated with less formal and less costly governance struc-
ures as well as superior performance. Trust would be a low-cost
ubstitute for monitoring instruments, but its use obviously can-
ot be generalized.
Hölstrom and Roberts (1998) develop a model of repeated
ames in which vertical integration reduces the temptation to
enegotiate a relational contract and thus affects the design of
he best contract that parties could sustain over time. The effect of
artial vertical integration is not due to the elimination or reduc-
ion of the risk of volatile prices, but to the reduction of incentives
o break supply contracts. Plural forms would tend to appear in
nvironments of lesser confidence and greater impersonality in
ransactions.
Implications for empirical research are exemplified in the
ollowing hypotheses:
 Power is not symmetrical. The costs of discontinuing the
relationship are uneven. There are some governance makers
and many governance takers. In heavily competitive mar-
kets transactions tend to be standardized in relation to few
dimensions of the product and terms of negotiation.
 Governance structures with higher levels of control and safe-
guards would be adopted in transactions with low levels
of trust, and less costly structures when agents trust each
other.
 The firm transacts with many agents who perform equiva-
lent functions (suppliers of agricultural raw materials, for
example) but who have different levels of risk aversion
w
C
p
tof mechanisms of governance to prevent opportunistic
behavior in academic teams.
and/or intertemporal preferences. In this case, the acquisition
through contracts with different pricing and risk allocation
mechanisms would be explained by the preferences of the
governance-takers, rather than by the attributes of the trans-
action.
imple  juxtaposition  of  pure  forms
The reasons given so far for the existence of plural forms are
inked to efficiency, and often to the affordable efficiency, given
he transaction costs. However, there are cases where firms main-
ain plural forms because it is costly to undo the least efficient
rrangement, or because there is no significant gain in rear-
angement. Different governance structures have been inherited
rom earlier periods in the firm’s history (and the environment in
hich it operates), and there is no obvious gain in maintaining
ome of them. We call strong path dependence cases where there
ould be gain in converging to a singular governance structure,
ut the cost of braking relationships is very high. Weak path
ependence refers to cases where reorganization costs are not
ignificant, but expected gains are negligible. In that case, the
elevant question would not be “why do you adopt plural forms?”
ut “why not?”. Once governance structures are already in place,
t would take some reason (incentive) to get rid of one of them.
able 4 presents cases belonging to this class.
Transaction Costs Economics may contribute to elucidate
ome of such cases, since inefficient structures could persist if
eorganizing transactions were too costly. In other cases, when
he firm seeks to preserve ties with stakeholders or suppliers that
upported the firm in its early history, the key to understanding
ould be supplied by Economic Sociology. In other cases, the
urchase of inputs in the spot market, at the same time when ver-
ical integration and contracts are employed, represents only an
ventual holding of a business opportunity, without any impact
n the organization of the supply chain.
Pongeluppe, Moron, and Lazzarinni (2014) report the case of
 pulp and paper company buying wood from small suppliers,
hich in the past were important for the growth of the company.
urrently the company vertically integrates reforestation and
roduces wood at competitive costs, but continues to maintain
he relationship with its traditional suppliers.
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Table 4
Examples of works in which plural forms are related to business history.
Year Author Country Industry Main findings
2005 Mizumoto and Zylbersztajn State of São Paulo – Brazil Eggs The authors have identified cases where distribution
through wholesalers perpetuates over time, with no
apparent advantages over relational contracts.
2014 Feltre, Paulillo, and Souza Filho State of São Paulo – Brazil Sugarcane The paper reports the case of a sugarcane production
plant, which was acquired at the beginning of the
group’s business history, without any evident
connection with the company’s sugar and alcohol plant
in a different region.
2014 Pongeluppe et al. Brazil Pulp and paper The firm has contracts with small producers, although
there are no cost advantages or synergies with vertically
integrated production.
2014 Smith et al. State of São Paulo – Brazil Rubber for footwear The authors have identified the practice of footwear
firms that eventually buy rubber on advantageous terms,
from tanneries or footwear factories facing liquidity
problems.
Table 5
Classification of plural forms of governance.
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Smith, Martnelli, and Machado Neto (2014) found a rubber
ootwear company that eventually buys raw material from the
pot market of other companies in the industry that for some
eason accumulated surplus stocks. The prices in these occa-
ional transactions are lower than the prices usually charged by
uppliers. The buyer does, in fact, arbitrage operations in input
arkets. This way of governing transactions does not affect
he governance structure used regularly, which are relational
ontracts.
In this set of cases, plural forms occur almost by accident.
hey are linked to the history of the company and/or the founding
amily, or to exceptional arbitrage opportunities in the markets
n which the company operates.
Hypothesis suitable to this class of plural forms seem like
hose: Vertical integration does not affect the conduct of transactions
through other governance structures.
s
b Reorganization costs are low, but incentives are also negligi-
ble.
 There are costly governance structures compared to the most
efficient, but the cost of reorganization (at least in the short
term) outweighs the benefit.
 There is no cost advantage in the vertical integration of input
supply.
 Some spot market purchases are sporadic and in exceptionally
advantageous conditions.
Table 5 summarizes the four large plural form classes, accord-
ng to their nature or main explanatory factors.
inal  considerationsThis paper presented an attempt to classify plural governance
tructures based on the rationality underlying the choice. The
enefit to research in plural forms of governance is primarily the
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aveat that the decision to adopt more than one governance struc-
ure to conduct the same transactions may have several motives
nd respond to different contexts. There is no single model that
ts the entire set of cases identified in the literature.
The starting point of the theoretical investigation was the
illiamson’s governance structure choice model, rooted in
oase’s theory of firm. The accumulated empirical research
as revealed in real economic life not only a high frequency
f plural governance structures, but also the complexity of the
henomenon.
It would be useful, in guiding future empirical research, to
lassify cases of plural forms, helping the researcher to choose
he most promising theoretical background for each case.
Four major classes of plural forms were identified. These are:
i) a class in which different governance structures are interde-
endent, and the transaction cost in the plural form is less than
he sum of the transaction costs of the singular forms; (ii) a class
hat encompasses cases of plural forms explained by constraints
n the resources of the firm; (iii) a class in which the choice
f governance instrument is made by governance-takers, who
iffers in regard to risk aversion and preference for liquidity;
iv) a class of plural forms constituted by a simple juxtaposition
f singular ones, without any evident benefit of using the plu-
al form. The latter class includes cases where assets have been
cquired throughout the company’s history and currently oper-
te as distinct decision centers even though ownership is in the
ands of the same people, as well as cases where longstanding
elationships are preserved for reasons not related to economies
f transaction costs.
The main limitation of this attempt to classify plural forms
s that it is not exhaustive. At any time new cases can be iden-
ified that do not fit into only one of the identified sets. With
espect to cases where governance structures are interdependent,
ifferences between industries and even between firms within
he same industry may be relevant to explain the interplay of
overnance structures in plural forms.
We hope that the classification proposed here contributes to
he design of new research in the area, saving efforts that would
e wasted if the researcher tries to harbor all cases of plural
orms under a single theoretical model.
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